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ARGUMENT 
The petitioner herein alleges that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the 
law in the following particulars: 
POINT I 
In the court's ruling the court stated, in footnote 2, after finding that the first set of 
interrogatories was not answered in a timely manner, that the appellant could not complain about 
that fact, since the appellant did not attempt to introduce the answers at trial. The court ignored 
the undisputed fact, cited in the brief and argued at oral argument, that Judge Stirba had 
previously ruled that the responses were timely. (See Appendix). As such, that ruling was the law 
of the case and appellant could not properly seek to admit these answers at trial. The appellant 
specifically appealed this portion of the case. According to Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the answers should have been deemed admitted. See In the Matter of Pendleton, 2000 
Adv. Rpt. 77; Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 1985). Judge Stirba's ruling specifically 
barred Plaintiff from introducing the answers at trial. 
POINT II 
The court did not address the issue of whether the trial court should have awarded 
damages after the time of the breach of the settlement agreement which was entered into in 1992, 
after the court found that the agreement was in fact never complied with. Appellant argued that 
by opting to re-open the case, the appellant did not waive the right to pursue damages for the 
breach, but could argue for such damages, as well as for additional damages under the remaining 
causes of action. In stating its ruling the trial court specifically recognized that the Appellant had 
suffered damages. The trial court made a finding that the settlement was not complied with and 
that damages had been suffered, yet awarded no damages. This court did not address this specific 
aspect of the case in its ruling. 
POINT III 
In ruling on the issue of sanctions, this court focused on only two of the examples of 
delayed and deficient discovery, rather than on the entire history of the case. The Appellant 
argued that the Appellee's conduct, taken as a whole, merited sanctions, citing the many 
instances of motions to compel, the claimed destruction of their file and lack of any relevant 
documents and other actions which resulted in the delay of the case for fourteen years. The 
Appellant's argument was that the conduct of the Appellee prevented the Appellant from being 
able to fairly try his case, and that the Appellee was therefore allowed to profit by its misdeeds. 
Appellant argued on appeal that Judge Stirba erred in denying the motion for sanctions wherein 
the entire pattern of conduct of the Respondent/Defendant was to delay and obstruct the 
prosecution of the lawsuit by the Plaintiff/Appellant. The overall conduct of the 
Respondent/Defendant was more egregious and damaging to the ability of the Plaintiff to 
proceed fairly than, for instance, the facts in Morton v. Continental Baking, 938 P.2d 271 (Utah 
1997). 
There are numerous examples where the Respondent claimed to be unable to provide 
documents, as they had admittedly destroyed these documents, knowing full well that the lawsuit 
was ongoing, and yet at trial, documents were produced or information subsequently surfaced. 
This behavior and conduct spanned years and in spite of the occurrence of this conduct over 
twelve years and yet Judge Stirba refused to impose sanctions. Had the court reviewed the entire 
file and the many motions which had to be filed to compel discovery, the deficient responses and 
the many instances wherein the Respondent claimed to have no information or documents to 
provide, and compared that with the evidence that they submitted at trial, it would be apparent 
that the entire conduct of the Respondent was to delay and obstruct the lawsuit, preventing the 
Appellant from being able, in a fair manner, to prove his case. This court did not adequately 
review the record and transcript and analyze it and the failure of Judge Stirba to impose sanctions 
or to otherwise act to protect the interests of the Plaintiff, as well as the interests of fair justice in 
this case. 
POINT IV 
This court, in analyzing the issue of the trial court's finding of a lack of malice, 
improperly interpreted the definition of legal malice and the facts adduced at trial. In this court's 
decision the court, while noting the standard of review was whether the trial court's findings 
were clearly erroneous, proceeded to cite the facts in support of the trial court's findings as if the 
legal standard was actual malice. The argument at trial, and on appeal, was that the actions of the 
Respondent, taken as a whole, clearly established legal, or imputed malice. In that regard the 
evidence was undisputed that the Appellant notified the Respondent by certified mail that the 
vehicle was being returned because it was defective. Malice should have been imputed by the 
evidence that the Respondent totally ignored any notices or phone calls, failed to respond in any 
way, and obstructed and delayed the lawsuit, including failing to even attempt to comply with the 
settlement agreement it signed in 1992. Neither this court or the trial court should impose the 
burden on the Appellant to prove actual malice, that is that someone within the Respondent's 
company harbored ill will toward the Appellant. The evidence presented should be analyzed 
against the standard of legal or imputed malice, that is that the actions, or inactions and 
indifference toward the Appellant's continued complaints, both before and after the lawsuit was 
filed, together with their violation of the settlement agreement could not be explained any other 
way than legal malice. 
The Respondent, under the circumstances, did not have to report the matter as it did. And 
it was undisputed that the Respondent knew that reporting the matter as a repossession was the 
most damaging way the transaction could be reported. And it did so knowing that this was in 
reality, a product dispute. Their failure to correct the matter, after being put on notice, as well as 
the matters stated above establishes legal malice and the court's findings were clearly erroneous. 
Wherefore, appellant requests that he be granted a rehearing on these matters. 
Counsel further certifies that this petition is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
DATED this day of ,2002. 
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APPENDIX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ADRIAN NICULESCU, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 
CORPORATION and CHRYSLER CREDIT 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 890906110CV 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
May 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, on March 22, 2000, plaintiff filed a "Motion for 
Sanctions and to Enter Default." On March 30, 2000, defendant, 
Chrysler Financial Company, as a successor-in-interest to Chrysler 
Credit Corporation, filed their "Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Sanctions and to Enter Default." On April 12, 2000, plaintiff 
filed its "Reply Regarding Motion for Sanctions and to Enter 
Default." The matter was submitted for decision on April 13, 2000. 
Neither party requested oral argument. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda and for the 
good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling. 
With this motion, plaintiff seeks an order of this Court 
deeming admitted plaintiff's requests for admission, striking 
Chrysler Financial's Answer and entering default against Chrysler 
Financial. Plaintiff bases this request upon what he alleges is 
Chrysler Financial's continual failure to respond to discovery. 
Chrysler Financial opposes the motion arguing it has timely 
responded to the orders of this Court, as well as subsequent 
discovery requests served by plaintiff. Accordingly, Chrysler 
Financial has done nothing to warrant sanctions or an entry of 
default. 
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This action was filed in 1989. In 1992, the parties entered 
into a settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, the 
Complaint was dismissed with prejudice in 1992. In 1997, plaintiff 
filed a motion to reopen the case, which was granted by this Court. 
On September 27, 1999, this Court entered a Minute Entry 
directing defendants to respond to plaintiff's previously filed 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents, and Requests 
for Admission, on or before October 8, 1999. According to the 
record, Chrysler Financial's response was dated and served October 
8, 1999. 
On November 8, 1999, plaintiff filed a Second Motion to 
Compel, asserting Chrysler Financial's October 8 response was not 
complete. Chrysler Financial opposed the morion by memorandum 
dated November 18, 1999, and supported by the Affidavit of Garry R. 
Howe. This motion was never submitted for decision and during this 
time, plaintiff's attorney withdrew from the case. 
On January, 27, 2000, plaintiff served defendant, by mail, a 
second set of Requests for Admission. Defendant served its 
response on February 28, 2000. 
Based upon the forgoing, it appears Chrysler Financial 
complied with the Court's Order to respond to previously filed 
discovery by October 8, 1999. Moreover, Chrysler Financial timely 
responded to plaintiff's second motion to compel1 and plaintiff's 
January Requests for Admission. Although plaintiff contends 
Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories are unresponsive, he does 
not specifically identify which answers are unresponsive or why he 
believes they are lacking. Finally, although Chrysler Financial 
admits not producing many documents in response to plaintiff s 
recent discovery request, according to the uncontorverted affidavit 
of Gary R. Howe, everything Chrysler Financial has to produce has 
been produced. 
Based upon the forgoing, there is no conduct on the part of 
Chrysler Financial that would warrant the granting of sanctions or 
the entry of default against Chrysler Financial. Accordingly, 
plaintiff's motion is respectfully, denied. 
xAs noted, this motion was never submitted for decision. 
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DATED this n day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M.J'STIRBA 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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